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EMPLOYMENT & DISABILITY LAW-AMEICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT OF 1990--THE WEIGHT OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY: OBESITY,
CAUSATION, AND PROTECTED PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
America and obesity have become almost synonymous. Now Ameri-
cans, who pride themselves on a strong work ethic, must face an escalating
and heavy challenge: the impact of obesity on the workforce. Obese persons
are increasingly the object of prejudice and discrimination, and when such
discrimination occurs in the workplace, litigation is bound to ensue. The
problem is that until relatively recently, our understanding of obesity's caus-
al factors was limited mostly to an individual's personal choices and respon-
sibility. Because of an increase in both federal protections for the disabled
and scientific understanding of obesity, courts, legislatures, and employers
must adapt to the ever-expansive nature of obesity litigation and America's
waistline.
On July 26, 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), which became effective two years later.' The stated goals of the
ADA were (1) "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities ' 2 and
(2) "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 3 Because the ADA
lacked a list of all the disabilities it covered, courts have considered obesity
and morbid obesity to be disabilities in some cases but not in others, not-
withstanding the legislation's desire for clarity and consistency in eliminat-
ing discrimination against the individuals with disabilities.4
Although the area of obesity discrimination is relatively new and still
developing, there seems to be a trend towards presuming that obesity is a
matter of personal responsibility rather than a protected disability. This trend
was recently confirmed by the Sixth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Watkins
Motor Lines, Inc.,5 in which the court determined that an employee's morbid
obesity was not a "physical impairment" and not a disability under the ADA
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2000).
4. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2nd Cir. 1997); Andrews v.
Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997); and Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, &
Hosps., 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
5. 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006).
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because he failed to show that his morbid obesity was "the result of a physi-
ological condition."6 This note will first consider the nature of obesity gen-
erally, the history of statutory protections for the disabled under the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 and the ADA, and the case law interpreting and applying
those statutory protections to situations of weight discrimination.7 The note
will focus particularly on the facts and reasoning in Watkins, as it marks a
significant shift in the trend towards personal responsibility! Finally, this
note will propose several potential responses to and impacts of recent trends
in obesity jurisprudence, including: (1) other ADA disabilities potentially
affected by the trend towards personal responsibility; (2) shared responsi-
bility and wellness programs; and (3) the failure to consider whether physi-
cal complications resulting from non-physiologically caused morbid obesity
may be ADA impairments.9
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the background of recent trends in obesity juri-
sprudence, one must first consider the relatively short but complex history
of obesity, weight discrimination, and other statutory protections for the
disabled in the United States. In deciding claims of weight discrimination
through a case-by-case approach, courts have taken into consideration the
nature of and research regarding obesity; what place obesity might have as a
protected disability under federal statutes; and how other courts have re-
solved issues of alleged weight discrimination based on the facts before
them. The following sections of this note will examine obesity, ° statutory
protections for the disabled," and the case law interpreting and applying
those statutory protections in the context of claims of weight discrimina-
tion," giving special attention to the Watkins decision. 3
A. Obesity
Obesity is an often misunderstood and easily misdiagnosed condition
with which an increasing number of Americans struggle on a daily basis. 4
6. Id. at 443.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. See Ctr. For Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity: Introduction,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/ (hereinafter Overweight and Obesity: Introduc-
tion) (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
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Because federal statutory protections for the disabled do not explicitly cover
obesity, parties to a weight discrimination suit must be able to present evi-
dence showing that a court should rightly consider a specific instance of
obesity to be a disability. 5 The following sections will look at the nature of
obesity as a disease, 6 America's increasing struggle with obesity, 7 and the
particularly difficult problem of understanding and treating morbid obesi-
ty.18
1. The Disease of Obesity
Obesity is generally defined as "[t]he excessive accumulation of body
fat."' 9 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
the most common way of determining the categories of "overweight" and
"obese" is by calculating an adult's Body Mass Index (BMI). 20 The BMI
accurately places most adults into their proper weight category because it
usually correlates with adults' actual body fat percentages. 2' There are three
basic categories of obesity. First, a person is "mildly obese" if he or she
weighs twenty to forty percent over the ideal body weight.22 Second, if a
person weighs forty-one to one hundred percent over the ideal body weight,
he or she is "moderately obese. 23 Finally, someone more than one hundred
percent over his or her ideal body weight suffers from "morbid" or "severe"
obesity.24 The side effects of obesity vary in degree depending on the level
of obesity and may include: increased morbidity and mortality, cardiovascu-
lar disease, diabetes, osteoarthritis, gout, ovulatory and menstrual irregulari-
ties, and possibly certain types of cancer.25
15. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 440-43 (6th Cir.
2006); Cook v. R. I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 22-24 (1st
Cir. 1993).
16. See infra Part II.A. 1.
17. See infra Part II.A.2.
18. See infra Part II.A.3.
19. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 981 (Robert Berkow et al. eds.,
16th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL].
20. Ctr. For Disease Control and Prevention, Overweight and Obesity: Defining Over-
weight and Obesity, http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/defining.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2007).
21. Id. The BMI method of categorizing people into weight categories has come under
much criticism as of late. See, e.g., Bethany Lye, Not Measuring Up,
http://health.msn.com/dietfitness/articlepage.aspx?cp-documentid=100155283 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2007). Many doctors point out that athletes who are strong and fit may actually fall
within the obese category, even though their body fat percentage is very low. Id.
22. MERCK MANuAL, supra note 19, at 981.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 442 (Gordon Macphereson ed., 40th ed. 2004).
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Although the mechanism by which someone becomes obese-
consuming more calories than are expended-is relatively simple, the un-
derlying causes of obesity are complex and not yet fully understood.
2 6 Stu-
dies of twins and adopted children "have firmly established that genetic fac-
tors are critical determinants of obesity., 27 Dysfunctions of the endocrine
and metabolic systems parallel an obese person's weight gain, although
whether the endocrine and metabolic dysfunctions directly cause obesity or
whether obesity causes these dysfunctions remains unclear.28 In some cases,
brain damage may even be a factor in causing obesity.29 In addition to genet-
ic and physiological influences, environmental surroundings, physical inac-
tivity, and psychological disturbances may promote an unhealthy lifestyle
that leads to weight gain.3° Although the precise interaction of these factors
is unknown with respect to obesity, an imbalance of these factors at some
point hinders the body's ability to regulate its own physiology, thus result-
ing in weight gain and potential obesity.31 Ultimately, true chronic obesity is
the result of an imbalance of calorie consumption versus energy production
caused by a combination of various factors: genetic, physiological, metabol-
ic, cellular, molecular, behavioral, environmental, cultural, and socioeco-
32nomic.
As a result of the increased understanding of obesity's complex physio-
logical nature, recent trends in obesity research have begun to focus less on
obesity as a behavioral disorder and more on the physiological disorders
leading to obesity.33 Although the scientific research has not reached a defin-
26. MERCK MANUAL, supra note 19, at 982.
27. Id.
28. Id
29. Id at 983. See also Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving a Deadly Sin: A Medical
and Legal Argument for Including Obesity as a Disability Under the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563, 572-73 (1996).
30. MERCK MANUAL, supra note 19, at 982-83.
31. Id at 982.
32. See United States Surgeon General's Call to Action to Prevent and Decrease Over-
weight and Obesity (2001),
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/factglance.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2007); National Institutes of Health, Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation,
and Treatment of Overweight and Obesity in Adults, 27 (1998) available at
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/obgdlns.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2007) [herei-
nafter Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and Treatment of Overweight and
Obesity in Adults].
33. See William C. Taussig, Note, Weighing in Against Obesity Discrimination: Cook v.
Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. and the Recognition of
Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act,
35 B.C. L. REv. 927, 930 (1994).
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itive conclusion as to the factors that contribute to obesity, America's strug-
gle with obesity is a definitive problem for present and future generations.34
2. America's Struggle with Obesity
America's population is becoming increasingly obese.35 Among adults
in the United States aged twenty to seventy-four years old, the prevalence of
obesity increased from 15% to 32.9% between 1980 and 2004.36 A recent
study by the National Center for Health Statistics-a branch of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)-determined that nearly two-
thirds of all American adults are either overweight or obese.37 The same
study concluded that the percentage of American adults falling into the "ob-
ese" category has risen by 61% since 1991, meaning that 14% of American
adults are now obese.38 Annual costs of healthcare associated with obese
Americans has now reached roughly $100 billion,39 which surpasses the
$75.5 billion in annual healthcare costs associated with smokers.40 These
statistics are indicative of a serious problem that is impacting the financial
stability of American employers.4 '
Unfortunately, obesity and its ramifications affect not only adults, but
children as well.42 Pediatric clinics are treating an increasing number of
children for obesity every year, in large part because the lifestyles and eating
habits that children have learned are a recipe for weight disaster, leading
some popular publications such as People Magazine to label the upcoming
generation as "Generation Overweight."43 Studies have shown that 80% of
34. See Overweight and Obesity: Introduction, supra note 14.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Robert J. Grossman, Countering a Weight Crisis: America's Growing Weight Prob-
lem Raises Serious HR Issues Relating to Health Care Costs, Wellness, Recruiting, and Em-
ployee Relations, HR MAGAZINE, Mar. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.shrm.org/hrtnagazine/articles/0304/0304covstory.asp. Other sources and studies
have put the number of obese or overweight Americans at slightly over one-third. See Kuss,
supra note 29, at 563-64 & n.5. The discrepancy in numbers is a result of different ways of
calculating obesity and overweight. Id. (citing studies from two individuals and one task
force regarding the percentages of obese and overweight American adults).
38. Grossman, supra note 37.
39. American Obesity Association, AOA Fact Sheets, available at
http://www.obesity.org/subs/ fastfacts/obesity what2.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
40. American Lung Association, Smoking 101 Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.lungusa.org/site/apps/s/content.asp?c=dvLUK900E&b=34706&ct-66713 (last
visited Mar. 3, 2007).
41. See id.
42. See Richard Jerome & Steve Barnes, Childhood Obesity: The Fight Against Fat,




children whose parents were both obese were obese themselves." Fifty per-
cent of children who had only one obese parent were themselves obese, and
only 10% of children without an obese parent were obese.45 Therefore,
whether because of genetic or environmental predisposition, children of
obese parents appear much more likely to be or at some point become ob-
ese.
46
Children may actually be more discriminatory than adults against their
obese peers.47 One study of grade school children found that most consider
obesity to be more of a disability than even dismemberment or disfigure-
ment, leading researchers to conclude that children thought obesity had a
serious influence on social relationships.48
The growing epidemic of childhood obesity has led state governments
to join in the fight at a local level. For example, Arkansas was the first state
to require schools to send BMI "report cards" of children to parents, inform-
ing them of their child's health.49 The BMI report cards are a way in which
federal, state, and local officials are trying to increase awareness regarding
the problem, prevention, and treatment of childhood obesity. °
Although children have misconceived notions regarding their obese
peers, many adults also have misconceptions surrounding obesity, and most
American adults believe that an obese person's major problem is a lack of
self-control. 1 Many see obesity as a voluntary condition resulting from lazi-
ness or a shortage of discipline, intelligence, and energy. 2 America is prac-
tically obsessed with weight control, perceiving those who are extremely
thin as the most attractive, even though being overweight was once consi-
dered a sign of wealth and opulence.53 Whether the cause of obesity is genet-
44. Kuss, supra note 29, at 571.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Taussig, supra note 33, at 933.
48. Id.
49. The instigator of the BMI "report cards" was the former Governor of Arkansas,
Mike Huckabee, who has received national recognition for his efforts to increase awareness
of and treatment programs for obesity. Laura Kellams, House, Senate Settle on BMI Bill,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 2007, at B1. The Arkansas state legislature is presently
negotiating with Governor Mike Beebe a new bill that would continue the BMI measure-
ments of public school children, although potentially reducing their frequency. Id. Many have
praised the program as a positive step in preventing or treating childhood obesity, but some
argue that the mandatory BMI report cards are an unnecessary usurpation by the government
of the parents' role. Id.
50. Id.
51. Taussig, supra note 33, at 932.
52. Id.
53. See Kuss, supra note 29, at 564; CareerBuilder.com, Is Your Weight Hurting Your
Career?, http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/careerbytes/cbarticle.aspx?articleid=658
(last visited Feb. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Is your Weight Hurting Your Career?].
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ics, physiological disorders, or lack of personal discipline, obese Americans
still suffer from discrimination.54 In fact, America's preconceived notions
regarding obesity have resulted in an increasing trend in unintentional-and
sometimes intentional-"appearance" discrimination against the obese in
the workplace.55
Although some may criticize employers for discriminating against
overweight and obese employees, employers have every reason to be con-
cerned about the financial impact that an overly obese workforce may have
on their businesses." Although overweight employees do not necessarily
cost an employer much more than those of a normal weight, the costs of
employees in the obese category are still significant.5 7 According to some
studies, obesity may be costing American businesses around $12.7 billion
each year.5" Healthcare expenses cost businesses 36% more for obese work-
ers than for normal weight workers.59 Medications cost 77% more for obese
employees than those of normal weight. 6' Employers may be able to meas-
ure these direct costs, but they also must account for the indirect costs asso-
ciated with obese workers, such as decreased productivity and increased
absenteeism. 61 Obesity financially impacts not only employers but also the
obese employees, who on average earn a lower percentage annually and
receive fewer promotions than their counterparts of normal weight.62 As
American employees continue to struggle with their weight, employers must
also deal with an increasing number of employees suffering from morbid
obesity, which involves more complex causations and more severe compli-
cations than mere obesity.
3. Morbid Obesity: Its Physiology and Disabling Consequences
Although fairly uncommon,63 morbid obesity's physiological characte-
ristics are similar to those of mere obesity, but the complications arising
54. See LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 4.9 (3d ed.
2006).
55. See Jennifer Shoup, Note, Title I Protecting the Obese Worker?, 29 IND. L. REv.
207, 213-14 (1995).






62. See Shoup, supra note 55, at 213-14; Is Your Weight Hurting Your Career?, supra
note 53.
63. Morbid obesity only affects about 0.1% of the population. MERCK MANUAL, supra
note 19, at 984.
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from morbid obesity are usually much more severe.' Some researchers sus-
pect that a major recessive gene, as yet undiscovered, may be involved in
morbid obesity, and many studies have shown that some persons are more
susceptible to morbid obesity than others.65 A person is morbidly obese
when he or she weighs 100% more than his or her ideal weight,66 and the
morbidly obese usually are ten to twelve BMI units heavier than their par-
ents or siblings.67 Because a normal routine of diet and exercise is usually
insufficient to combat morbid obesity, the most common treatment is sur-
gery.
68
Even if a morbidly obese individual is initially able to lose weight, a
great majority of the morbidly obese eventually regain that weight.69 A con-
tinual pattern of losing and regaining weight over time will usually result in
a lowered resting metabolic rate, which permanently impairs an obese per-
son's ability ever to keep the weight off.7° Some courts have recognized that
once a person reaches the level of morbid obesity, his or her metabolism
becomes permanently dysfunctional, which in itself is a physical impairment
separate from the state of morbid obesity.7 Those who are morbidly obese
are particularly prone to hypoventilation, carbon dioxide retention, blood
circulatory dysfunctions, hypertension, and endocrine and metabolic com-
plications.7 2 Even the morbidly obese who are asymptomatic have quantifia-
ble and increased risks of certain health defects, morbidity, and mortality;
73
and those who return to normal weight may still be at an increased risk for
premature death and morbidity.74 Thus, regardless of morbid obesity's
cause, the permanent physiological impact that it has may be sufficient to
consider morbid obesity as a disabling physiological disorder.75
64. Id. at 984.
65. Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and Treatment of Overweight
and Obesity in Adults, supra note 32, at 28.
66. MERCK MANUAL, supra note 19, at 981.
67. Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and Treatment of Overweight
and Obesity in Adults, supra note 32, at 28.
68. MERCK MANUAL, supra note 19, at 984.
69. Kuss, supra note 29, at 595-96.
70. Id. at 596.
71. See, e.g., Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17,
14 (1st Cir. 1993).
72. TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1378-79 (Paul B. Beeson & Walsh McDermott eds., 14th
ed. 1975).
73. Kuss, supra note 29, at 597-98.
74. Id. at 598.
75. Id. at 595.
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B. Statutory Protections for the Disabled: The History and Meaning of the
Americans With Disabilities Act
Federal statutory protections for the disabled are relatively new in the
United States.76 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was landmark
legislation aimed at preventing and remedying discrimination against the
disabled in the workplace, but Congress did not create its provisions and
definitions in a vacuum. 77 In order to provide a context for the ADA and its
protections for the disabled, the following sections will consider the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973 (a precursor to the ADA),78 the legislative history and
enactment of the ADA itself,79 and the meaning of "disability" under the
ADA.8°
1. The ADA 's Beginnings: The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 197381 (the "Rehabilitation Act") was the
first instance of federal statutory protection of the rights of disabled Ameri-
cans. Congress limited the scope of the Rehabilitation Act to federal agen-
cies and entities receiving federal funding.82 The Rehabilitation Act's pro-
tections did not extend to disability discrimination by private employers.83
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which provided a definition of "disa-
bility" that would serve as a foundation for the ADA's definition, prohibited
any federal agency or entity receiving federal assistance from discriminating
on the basis of disability. 4
The Rehabilitation Act created a broad prohibition against discrimina-
tion: "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...
,85 An individual is disabled under this act if he or she "(i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is re-
76. Prior to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, there was no federal statutory law protecting
the disabled.
77. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
78. See infra Part II.B.1.
79. See infra Part II.B.2.
80. See infra Part II.B.3.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 701 etseq. (2000).
82. See MICHAEL FAILLACE, DISABILITY LAW DESKBOOK: THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT IN THE WORKPLACE § 1:2 (Incorporating Release No. 8 2005).
83. Id.




garded as having such an impairment."86 The Rehabilitation Act required the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to promulgate regula-
tions implementing the provisions of the act. The DHHS regulations defined
"physical impairment" as "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respira-
tory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, geni-
to-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine.""7
The Rehabilitation Act has undergone a number of amendments since
its original enactment. In 1993, Congress amended the language of the Re-
habilitation Act to replace "handicapped" with "disabled." 8 In 1987, an
amendment clarified that the Rehabilitation Act's protections may not cover
some contagious diseases or infections.89 In the 1990s Congress amended
the Rehabilitation Act to state that it may cover those suffering from alco-
holism or drug addiction under certain circumstances, 90 but that it specifical-
ly precluded certain behavioral "disorders" from coverage. 9' Although most
disability law began to center primarily on the ADA after its enactment in
1990, the Rehabilitation Act's definitions of "disabled" and "physical im-
pairment"--and the regulations and court opinions corresponding to those
definitions-are benchmarks for understanding and applying the ADA's
definitions and accompanying regulations.
2. Enactment of the ADA
In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).92 Title I of the ADA is the employment section, which Congress
intended to close the gaps between the Rehabilitation Act and the various
state statutes on employment discrimination.93 The ADA did not preempt the
Rehabilitation Act, therefore an employer covered by the Rehabilitation Act
86. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(i)-(iii) (2000).
87. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (2005).
88. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (1993).
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(D) (2000).
90. See id. § 705(20)(C)(v) (2000).
91. See id. § 705(20)(E)-(F) (2000). Such precluded behavioral "disorders" that do not
constitute a "disability" include: homosexuality; bisexuality; transvestism; transsexualism;
pedophilia; exhibitionism; voyeurism; gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments; compulsive gambling; kleptomania; pyromania; and psychoactive substance
use disorders. Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq. (2000).
93. See ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 54, at § 4:6; RuTH COLKER, THE
DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 22
(2005) ("The ADA is truly landmark legislation for individuals with disabilities because it
reflects the first time that the federal government has imposed rules on the private sector that
it has generally applied to the publicly financed sector for nearly thirty years.").
[Vol. 30
EMPLOYMENT & DISABILITY LAW
is likely covered by the ADA as well. 94 Although the ADA adopted much of
the same language as the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA was unique because
its protections applied to private entities in addition to those receiving feder-
al funds.95
One motivating factor for passage of the ADA was to continue the
work of the Civil Rights Movement, which had culminated in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.96 Another impetus was the need to protect an increasing
number of disabled Americans, particularly those suffering from discrimina-
tion because of an HIV infection.97 In the 1980s, Congress began to recog-
nize that many disabled Americans were willing to work yet were unable to
do so because of the pervasive problem of disability discrimination in the
workplace. 98 One report from the House of Representatives concluded that
66% of all disabled Americans-more than 8.2 million people-had a desire
to work and yet remained unemployed. 99 Both houses of Congress engaged
in considerable debate regarding new legislation that would guarantee the
rights of disabled individuals in the private sector."° Relying on its powers
under the Commerce Clause 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 0 2 Congress
ultimately passed the ADA in July of 1990, and its provisions took effect
two years later, on July 26, 1992.1"3
3. Disability under the ADA
At the time Congress passed the ADA, about 20% of Americans-over
forty-nine million people-were considered obese."° Congress stated that
the ADA would provide protection for forty-three million disabled Ameri-
cans.10 5 The text of the ADA did not explicitly name obesity as a disability,
94. ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 54, at § 4:6.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 etseq. (2000).
97. See COLKER, supra note 93, at 22.
98. FAILLACE, supra note 82, at § 1:2.
99. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (1990).
100. For an extensive overview of the legislative history of the ADA, see COLKER, supra
note 93, at 22-68; see also Carol R. Buxton, Comment, Obesity and the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 4 BARRY L. REv. 109, 111-12 (Fall 2003); Claudia Center & Andrew J.
Imparato, Redefining "Disability" Discrimination: A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Pro-
tections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 321, 321-22 (2003); Jeffrey Garcia,
Weight-Based Discrimination and the Americans With Disabilities Act: Is There an End in
Sight?, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 209, 211-15 (Fall 1995).
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
103. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
104. Buxton, supra note 100, at 112.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000).
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meaning that Congress did not at that time consider obesity to be an explicit-
ly protected disability under the ADA.'06
The ADA's definition of disability is identical to that of the Rehabilita-
tion Act: "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities."' 0 7 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) regulations to the ADA provide a definition of "physical im-
pairment," but that definlion differs slightly from the definition in the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations to the Rehabil-
itation Act.0 8 Unlike the DHHS regulations, the EEOC regulations define
physical impairment as "a physiological disorder, or condition."' 0 9 Because
the ADA explicitly intended to adopt the Rehabilitation Act's definitions of
disability and physical impairment, courts generally consider the language
of the Rehabilitation Act and case law surrounding it as controlling." 0
C. The Development of Case Law Regarding Obesity Under Federal Sta-
tutory Law
Beginning with the Rehabilitation Act, courts had to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether an individual's particular case of obesity consti-
tuted a disability protected by federal statutory law. Because the statutory
law protecting the disabled did not explicitly cover the condition of obesity,
courts recognized obesity as a protected disability in some instances but not
in others. The following sections consider how courts have interpreted and
applied the protections of the Rehabilitation Act"'. and the ADA" 2 where an
employee has claimed weight discrimination resulting from his or her obesi-
ty.
1. Case Law Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Because the Rehabilitation Act was the first attempt by the federal
government to protect the disabled from discrimination, courts had little
prior precedent to assist them in interpreting the applicability of the Rehabil-
itation Act's provisions. The Rehabilitation Act's definitions of "disability"
and "physical impairment" were broad enough potentially to cover a wide
range of conditions, including obesity. The following are the two primary
cases in which courts applied the Rehabilitation Act to claims of weight
106. See id. § 12101.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
108. See supra Part II.B.1.
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1993).
110. See infra Part II.C.
111. See infra Part II.C. 1.
112. See infra Part II.C.2.
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discrimination due to an employee's obesity,' 3 Tudyman v. United Air-
lines'14 and Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retarda-
tion, & Hospitals.'
a. Tudyman v. United Airlines
The first major case interpreting weight discrimination under federal
statutory law prior to the ADA was Tudyman v. United Airlines. 16 That case
involved a suit brought under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. '17 United Airlines ("United") maintained a strict policy that estab-
lished the maximum weight for applicants of a particular height to become
flight attendants." 8 The plaintiff in Tudyman was fifteen pounds over the
maximum limit for his height when he reapplied for a flight attendant posi-
tion in 1983." 9 United's weight policy apparently had no relation to any
practical limitations concerning an aircraft's flight load or a flight atten-
dant's ability to perform his or her duties. 2° Instead, the purpose of the poli-
cy was primarily to ensure that flight attendants, who worked closely with
customers, were presentable in appearance.' 2' The plaintiffs weight prob-
lems, however, stemmed not from excessive fat but from excessive body
building.'22 The plaintiff claimed that United discriminated against him as a
"handicapped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act.
23
In the relevant portion of the decision, the court for the Central District
of California began its analysis by considering the definition of "handi-
capped individual" under the Rehabilitation Act. 24 The court noted that few
prior cases had discussed at length the definition of "handicapped individu-
al" in the context of particular facts, but clearly an employer's policies must
discriminate against the actually handicapped for those policies to be illegal
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 25 The court concluded that the
plaintiff was not "handicapped" because he did not have a physical impair-
113. See infra Part II.C. .a-b.
114. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
115. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
116. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
117. Id. at 740.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 740-41. The plaintiff had previously worked for United, which terminated him
in 1980 and denied him reinstatement in 1982 because of his weight problems. Id.
120. Id. at 741.
121. Id.
122. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 741.
123. See id. at 743.
124. Id. at 743-44.
125. Id. at 745.
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ment or a substantial limitation of a major life activity and because United
merely perceived the plaintiff to be over a particular weight limit.'26
A unique strain in the court's rationale was its discussion of the "volun-
tariness" of the plaintiff's condition and whether it constituted a "physiolog-
ical disorder."' 27 The court distinguished the plaintiff's situation-his physi-
cal condition being "self-imposed and voluntary"--from a situation in
which an individual's weight problem might be involuntary-for example,
resulting from a glandular dysfumction' 28 The court stated that the volunta-
riness of a person's physical condition could be one factor in deciding
whether that condition falls under the protections of section 504.29 In part
because the plaintiff assumed his physical condition voluntarily, the court
held that his weight condition could not be a physical impairment-and thus
a handicap--under the Rehabilitation Act. 30
b. Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retar-
dation, & Hospitals
Although the First Circuit decided Cook v. Rhode Island, Department
of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hospitals3' after the passage of the ADA,
the claim arose from facts taking place before the ADA's enactment and,
therefore, the plaintiff, Bonnie Cook ("Cook"), asserted a violation of the
Rehabilitation Act rather than the ADA.'32 The defendant, the Department of
Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH), denied Cook's applica-
tion because her morbid obesity would make it difficult for her to evacuate
patients in emergency situations and made her susceptible to serious ail-
ments.'3 3 Cook sued under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and MHRH
appealed the jury's verdict in her favor.'34
On appeal, the First Circuit stated that two of MHRH's arguments were
futile.'35 MHRH's first argument was that morbid obesity could not be an
impairment under the Rehabilitation Act because it is a "mutable condition,"
which section 504 does not cover.'3 6 The fundamental premise of this argu-
ment was that Cook could choose to lose some weight and thus lose her
126. Id. at 746.
127. Id.
128. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. 10 F.3d 17 (lst Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at20-21.
133. Id. at 21 n.7. Cook weighed more than 320 pounds and was only 5 feet 2 inches in
height. Id. at 20.
134. Id. at21.
135. See id. at 23-24.
136. Id. at 23.
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disability.'37 The court, however, reasoned that mutability was not "an au-
tomatic disqualifier under section 504" and was only one factor in consider-
ing the substantial limitation of a major life activity.'38 Cook had presented
evidence that metabolic dysfunction persisted even after a morbidly obese
individual lost weight, thus constituting metabolic dysfunction as a perma-
nent physical impairment once an individual had reached the point of mor-
bid obesity.'39 In addition, even if Cook had presented no evidence regarding
a dysfunctional metabolism, the court stated in dicta that Cook's morbid
obesity could still be an impairment under the "regarded as" prong if
MHRH had considered her morbid obesity to be an immutable characteris-
tic.
140
MHRH's second argument was that Cook's voluntary conduct caused
or contributed to causing her morbid obesity.14' The court observed that the
Rehabilitation Act "contain[ed] no language suggesting that its protection
[was] linked to how an individual became impaired, or whether an individu-
al contributed to his or her impairment."' 4 2 In fact, the court listed a number
of conditions that voluntary conduct may cause or exacerbate and that the
Rehabilitation Act indisputably covers, such as heart disease, lung cancer
from cigarettes, AIDS, alcoholism, and diabetes. ' 3 Because Cook intro-
duced evidence regarding the physiological causes of morbid obesity, the
court concluded that a reasonable jury could have determined that her physi-
cal condition was beyond her control.'"
2. Case Law Under the ADA
After the enactment of the ADA, courts had new federal regulations to
interpret and apply with respect to weight discrimination and obesity. Al-
though many courts looked for precedent in prior case law under the Reha-
bilitation Act because of its similarity to the ADA, 14 not many previous
137. Cook, 10 F.3d at 23.
138. Id. at 24 n.7.




143. Cook, 10 F.3d at 24.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1248 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999)
("interpretations of the ADA are guided by Rehabilitation Act precedent"); Menkowitz v.
Pottstown Mem'l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Courts, including our own,
have accordingly examined Rehabilitation Act precedent in examining the scope of coverage
under the ADA."); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996)
("Analysis of claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act roughly parallels those
brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.").
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cases had discussed whether an individual's obesity constituted a disability.
The following three sections consider cases that serve as guideposts in the
development of court interpretation of "disability" under the ADA in the
context of obesity.'46
a. Morrow v. City of Jacksonville
In Morrow v. City of Jacksonville,'47 the court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas took up an issue on which neither party's brief had focused:
whether the obese plaintiff was "disabled" within the meaning of the
ADA. 48 The plaintiff, Ms. Morrow, had begun working for the Jacksonville
police department in 1978.' 49 In 1993, less than one year after the effective
date of the ADA, the department instituted a new obstacle course test, which
Ms. Morrow failed three times. ' As a result, the department suspended her
and threatened to fire her if she was unable to pass the test at a later date.''
After she filed EEOC charges, the department allowed her to return to a
different assignment, but both the department doctor and her personal physi-
cian recommended that she not take the test because she was "markedly
obese" and suffered from hypertension.'52 Finally, the department placed her
on indefinite sick leave, and she filed a second EEOC complaint. '
Although neither party addressed whether Ms. Morrow was "disabled"
under the ADA, the court stated that a claimant must be able to meet the
"threshold burden" of demonstrating that he or she has a disability under the
ADA. 5 4 After stating the ADA definition of "disability," the court noted
that there was "scant authority anywhere, and none from the Eighth Circuit,
for the proposition that obesity is a disability [per se]."' The district court
effectively conceded that Ms. Morrow suffered from a physical impairment,
stating that her obesity and hypertension were "impairments."' 56 Because the
court assumed that Ms. Morrow's obesity was a physical impairment, it in-
stead focused on the second part of the ADA test: whether that physical im-
pairment substantially limited one or more major life activities.' The court
concluded that the question of substantial limitation was a question of fact
146. See infra Part II.C.2.a.--c.
147. 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
148. Id. at 821.
149. Id. at 818.
150. Id. at 818-19.
151. Id. at 819.
152. Id.
153. Morrow, 941 F. Supp. at 819.
154. Id. at 821.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 822-23.
157. See id. at 821-23.
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for the jury and, therefore, denied the defense's summary judgment motion
as to that issue.'58
b. Andrews v. Ohio
In Andrews v. Ohio, 59 a group of seventy-six police officers failed a
mandatory fitness program because they were either too heavy or could not
meet other fitness standards.' 6 The officers filed suit under both the Reha-
bilitation Act and the ADA, claiming that the tests were not consistent with
their job requirements and that Ohio perceived them to be disabled. 6' After
the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Sixth Circuit con-
sidered whether the officers' weight and fitness problems constituted a disa-
bility under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.
62
After discussing the statutory and regulatory definitions of disability
and physical impairment, the Sixth Circuit extensively examined the Tudy-
man 163 and Cook"6 decisions.1 65 Recognizing that the claimant in Cook suf-
fered from morbid obesity that necessarily involved "a metabolic disorder
that was permanent,"' 66 the court concluded that the officers' situation was
much more similar to Tudyman than to Cook.167 The officers only demon-
strated the existence of a physical characteristic that was "marginally above
a weight limit or marginally below a fitness standard."'' 68 Because the offic-
ers did not allege that their status was a physiological disorder or an im-
pairment-meaning that their condition was essentially a mere physical cha-
racteristic-the court found that they failed to meet their prima facie burden
and, therefore, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 1
69
c. Francis v. City of Meriden
In Francis v. City of Meriden,7' the Second Circuit explicitly adopted
the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Andrews. 7' In Francis, a
158. Id. at 823.
159. 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997).
160. Id. at 805.
161. Id. at 805-06.
162. See id. at 806-08.
163. See supra Part I.C. l.a.
164. See supra Part II.C.l.b.
165. See Andrews, 104 F.3d at 809-10.
166. Id. at 809.
167. See id. at 810.
168. Id.
169. Id.




firefighter had repeatedly failed to meet the weight standards of the fire-
fighter union's collective bargaining agreement.'72 The fire department
eventually suspended him one day without pay; that same year the depart-
ment also suspended a captain, two lieutenants, and a fire inspector for the
same reasons. 73 Francis brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, claiming that the department discriminated against him by perceiving
him to have a protected disability.'74
The Second Circuit first covered the Rehabilitation Act and ADA defi-
nitions of disability and physical impairment.'75 The court explained that, to
state a claim under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA, a claimant must
allege that the employer perceived the claimant as suffering an impairment
"that, if it truly existed, would be covered under the statutes and that the
employer discriminated against the plaintiff on that basis."'76 In fact, one of
the purposes of the "regarded as" prong was to protect those whose impair-
ments had a history of stigmatization. 77 The court held that Francis's claim
was insufficient because obesity was not an ADA impairment, "except in
special cases where the obesity relates to a physiological disorder.' ' 78 The
court acknowledged that previous decisions had recognized such a cause of
action to lie when the claimant was morbidly obese or suffered from a phy-
siologically caused weight disorder, but the court pointed out that Francis
had merely failed to meet a weight standard. 179 Thus, because Francis had
not alleged that he suffered from an impairment under the ADA, the court
ruled that the protections that the ADA did not apply to him. 1
80
Standing in the background of the previously discussed cases is the
continually developing scientific research regarding the nature and causes of
obesity.' 8' The development of statutory protections for the disabled-such
as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA-has provided courts with
new opportunities and new challenges in deciding claims of disability dis-
crimination. 82 More specifically, how various courts have resolved issues of
alleged weight discrimination provides important context for understanding
172. Id. at 282.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 282-83.
175. Id. at 283-84.
176. Francis, 129 F.3d at 285.
177. Id. at 287.
178. Id. at286.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 287.
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. See supra Part J.B.
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the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in EEOC v. Watkins, which has solidified the
shift towards personal responsibility.183
D. Watkins and the Solidified Shift Towards Personal Responsibility
The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Watkins helped to solidify a shift
towards a presumption of personal responsibility as the primary causal fac-
tor of obesity, rather than any other number of elements that are outside of
one's control. Because Watkins is important for understanding the extent of
recent developments in obesity discrimination, this note considers the
Watkins decision more in depth than those that preceded it. The following
sections will consider the facts underlying the case'84 and the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning in analyzing and resolving the dispute. 5
1. The Facts
Watkins Motor Lines ("Watkins") hired Stephen Grindle ("Grindle") in
August of 1990 to work as a driver and dock worker, which required him to
be able to load, unload, and arrange heavy freight on Watkins' docks. 6
When Watkins hired Grindle, he weighed approximately 345 pounds; over
the next five years of his employment with Watkins, his weight fluctuated
from 340 to 450 pounds. 7
In November of 1995, Grindle injured his knee while at work.' De-
spite the knee injury, Grindle returned to work the following day and con-
tinued working. 89 Finally, on January 22, 1996, the injury from his Novem-
ber accident forced Grindle to take a leave of absence. 9
Watkins's policy was to terminate any employee whose leave of ab-
sence continued for longer than 180 days.' To return to work, an employee
had to procure a release stating that he or she was fit to return to work.
92
The policy also placed the employee on notice that Watkins could ask him
or her to take a physical exam as a prerequisite for returning to work. 93
183. See infra Part II.D; EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 441-43 (6th
Cir. 2006).
184. See infra Part II.D.1.
185. See infra Part II.D.2.










After six months of physical therapy and nearly 180 days after his ini-
tial leave of absence, Grindle's doctor, Dr. Zancan, authorized him to return
to work and granted the required release. 94 Because Dr. Zancan had issued
the release without reviewing the nature of Grindle's job duties, however,
Watkins refused to accept that release. 95 Instead, Watkins sent Dr. Zancan a
copy of Grindle's job duties and a copy of the company's own release form
for his signature. 196 Watkins never received a response from Dr. Zancan and
refused to accept the original release. 97
In June of 1996, Watkins directed Grindle to see the industrial clinic
doctor, Dr. Walter Lawrence.' 98 Dr. Lawrence found that Grindle had a li-
mited range of motion and that "he could duck and squat but he was short of
breath after a few steps."' 99 Dr. Lawrence stated that "the most notable item"
of Grindle's physical examination was his weight at 405 pounds."° Dr. Law-
rence concluded that Grindle "could not safely perform the requirements of
his job." '' In light of Dr. Lawrence's conclusions and because Watkins had
not received the required signed release from Dr. Zancan, Watkins placed
Grindle on "safety hold., 20 2 Grindle remained on "safety hold" until the ex-
piration of the 180-day leave period for returning to work, and Watkins sub-
sequently terminated Grindle. °3
Believing that Watkins had discharged him because of his morbid ob-
esity, Grindle filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) on September 30, 1998.2o4 Four years and one month
later, the EEOC filed suit in federal district court contending that Watkins
had violated the ADA by firing Grindle. °5 On February 9, 2004, Watkins
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that obesity without a physi-
ological causation was not an "impairment" under the ADA.2 °6 The district
court granted Watkins's motion for summary judgment because "non-
physiologically caused obesity is not an 'impairment' under ADA."'207 The
EEOC appealed.20 8 In granting review, the Sixth Circuit weighed in on
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 438-39.
197. Id. at 439.










208. Id. at 438.
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whether non-physiologically caused morbid obesity is an impairment under
the ADA.2°9
2. The Sixth Circuit's Reasoning
After briefly considering and then rejecting Watkins's affirmative de-
fense of laches, 21° the majority opinion held that morbid obesity, without any
evidence of physiological causation, was not an impairment for purposes of
the ADA.211 Judge Julia Smith Gibbons concurred with the majority but
wrote separately to underscore the possibility that morbid obesity, by its
very nature, may have a physiological cause even if no evidence points to
the nature of that cause.212
a. The majority opinion
The court's primary consideration was whether and under what cir-
cumstances morbid obesity could be considered a physical impairment-and
thus potentially a protected disability-under the ADA.213 First, the majority
summarized the definitions of both "disability" and "impairment" as those
terms apply in the ADA.24 Next, the majority analyzed its decision in An-
drews v. Ohio2 5 and the EEOC's subsequent reliance on that particular
case.216 Finally, the majority applied its analysis of Andrews to the ADA
definitions of "disability" and "impairment" 21 7 and ultimately determined
that Grindle's obesity did not fall under those definitions because he did not
provide evidence of any physiological causation.21 s
i. Morbid obesity as an ADA impairment
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis of whether Grindle's morbid obesi-
ty constituted a disability under the ADA by considering the definitions of
both "disability" and "impairment" under the ADA.21 9 The ADA prohibits
discrimination by an employer against any qualified individual with a disa-
209. Id. at 440-43.
210. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 439,440.
211. Id. at441.
212. Id. at 443 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
213. Id. at440-43.
214. See infra Part II.D.2.a.i.
215. 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997).
216. See infra Part II.D.2.a.ii.
217. See infra Part II.D.2.a.iii.
218. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 443.
219. Id. at 440.
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bility.22° A "disability" for purposes of the ADA is a "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual."22' Even if the impairment is not substantially limiting,
however, an individual may also suffer from a disability protected by the
ADA if he or she has "a record of such an impairment," '222 or if he or she is
"regarded as having such an impairment. "223 These possibilities constitute
the "three prongs" under which an individual may successfully claim an
ADA disability.
22 4
On appeal, the EEOC argued that the alleged discrimination against
Grindle fell under the "regarded as" prong, which required the EEOC to
show that Watkins perceived Grindle to have an impairment protected by
the ADA.2 25 The district court had held that Grindle's obesity could not be a
disability because "non-physiological morbid obesity is not an 'impairment'
under the ADA," and that such obesity could only be an ADA impairment if
it had a physiological cause. 226 Therefore, before the appellate court could
consider whether morbid obesity was a disability under the ADA, the major-
ity first had to resolve "whether non-physiologically caused morbid obesity
[was] an ADA impairment. '227
The majority set out the definitions of "impairment" and "physical im-
pairment" as found in the EEOC's regulations and in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, respectively.228 The EEOC's "Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act" defined
impairment as:
220. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
221. Id.
222. Id. § 12102(2)(B).
223. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
224. See id. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). The majority did not mention the "record of such im-
pairment" prong. Instead, it labeled the "regarded as" prong as the "second prong," even
though it was actually the "third" of the ADA prongs regarding disability. Watkins, 463 F.3d
at 440. The majority's misnomer resulted from its reliance on the language of a United States
Supreme Court decision, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), ("There
are two [types of ADA disabilities] . .. : (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a per-
son has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2)
a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities."). See id.
225. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 440. In a footnote, the majority noted that the EEOC took ex-
ception to the district court's application of the Sutton standard. However, the majority clari-
fied and affirmed the district court's holding that "to succeed on a 'regarded as' claim, the
perceived condition must be an 'impairment' under the ADA." See Watkins, 463 F.3d at 440
n.2.
226. Id. at 441 (citing District Court Opinion, R. 80).
227. Id. at 440-41.
228. Id. at 441.
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(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (includ-
ing speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-
urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) Any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn-
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
229
The foundation for that definition was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which defined "physical impairment" in nearly the same language, except
that the Rehabilitation Act did not place a comma separating "physiological
disorder" from "or condition., 230 The court reasoned that an individual may
have a particular characteristic that an employer regards unfavorably, but
that characteristic must rise to the level of an impairment under the ADA in
order for the ADA's protections to apply.231' The majority explained that, if
an individual's obesity is a mere physical characteristic rather than an ADA
impairment, an employer is legally entitled to choose one particular physical
characteristic and reject another.232 Although the EEOC conceded that non-
physiological moderate obesity was generally more similar to a physical
characteristic than an impairment, it argued that morbid obesity-more than
100% over the normal body weight-was an ADA impairment regardless of
physiological causation.233 The EEOC had based its argument on a particular
sentence from Andrews v. Ohio,3 however, and the majority was quick to
manifest the importance of context in interpreting the meaning of that sen-
tence.235
ii. Analysis of the EEOC's reliance upon the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in Andrews v. Ohio
The EEOC based its argument-that non-physiological morbid obesity
was an ADA impairment--"almost entirely on [ ] one of the last sentences
of [the Sixth Circuit's] decision in Andrews v. State of Ohio.236 In that case,
police officers had exceeded the official weight standard, and the court held:
229. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2006).
230. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (2006). The majority made no mention of the difference in punctua-
tion, but the concurring opinion later used the difference to buttress its interpretation of the
definition of impairment. See infra Part II.D.2.b.
231. See Watkins, 463 F.3d at 441.
232. Id. (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 473 (1999)).
233. Id. at441.
234. 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997).
235. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 441-42; see also infra Part lI.D.2.a.ii.
236. Id. at 441-42.
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The officers have not alleged that Ohio perceives them to have any im-
pairment. That is, they have not alleged a weight or fitness status which
is other than a mere, indeed possibly transitory, physical characteristic;
they have not alleged a status which is the result of a physiological con-
dition or otherwise beyond the range of "normal. 237
The majority stated that the Andrews decision did not stand for the
proposition that "any abnormal physical characteristic [was] a potential
ADA impairment." '238 Rather, the context of the entire decision was impera-
tive for a proper interpretation of its language regarding abnormal physical
characteristics.
239
The majority reiterated that only physical characteristics with some un-
derlying physiological disorder could constitute ADA impairments. 240 Like
the EEOC in Watkins, the police officers in Andrews attempted to advance
their case under the "regarded as" prong of the ADA.2 4 1 That court could not
consider the police officers' obesity to be an impairment because their ob-
esity lacked a proven physiological disorder, and "a mere physical characte-
ristic does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder.242
The Andrews court relied on two other decisions-the First Circuit case
of Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, &
Hospitals143 and a California District Court case styled Tudyman v. United
Airlines244-both of which ruled that a physiological cause was necessary
for a physical characteristic to be an impairment.245 In addition, the Watkins
majority noted that a Second Circuit case had interpreted Andrews as hold-
ing that physical characteristics--even those outside of a normal range-
must have some physiological causation in order to be impairments under
the ADA.246 Therefore, the majority reaffirmed that the Andrews language
was only meant to emphasize that the plaintiffs' obesity, being neither phy-
siologically caused nor abnormal, was "far from constituting an ADA im-
pairment.
' 241
237. Id. at 442 (quoting Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810).
238. See id. at 442.
239. Id. at 442.
240. Id. (citing Andrews, 104 F.3d at 808 ("[P]hysical characteristics that are 'not the
result of a physiological disorder' are not considered 'impairments' for the purposes of de-
termining either actual or perceived disability.")).
241. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 442.
242. Id. (quoting Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810).
243. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
244. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
245. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 442 (citing Cook, 10 F.3d 17; Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. 739).
246. Id. (citing Francis v. City of Meridian, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997)).
247. Id.
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iii. Application of the Andrews analysis to the ADA under-
standing of "disability" and "impairment"
Finally, the majority applied the Andrews analysis to the previously
discussed definitions of impairment and physical impairment.148 The court
held that the ADA's protections did not extend to all physical characteristics
that happened to be abnormal.249 If all abnormal physical characteristics
were impairments under the ADA,
the central purpose of the statutes, to protect the disabled, [would be] in-
cidental to the operation of the 'regarded as' prong, which would become
a catch-all cause of action for discrimination based on appearance, size,
and any number of other things far removed from the reasons the statutes
were passed.25 °
Therefore, the court ruled that obesity, "even morbid obesity," must re-
sult from some physiological condition in order to constitute an impairment
under the ADA.25' The EEOC was unable to offer any proof that Grindle's
morbid obesity had a physiological causation. 2 Therefore, because Grin-
dle's obesity had no proven physiological causation-a necessary element
of an ADA impairment-the court found that Grindle's morbid obesity was
not an impairment under the ADA.253 As a result, the court felt no need to
consider the remaining elements of the "regarded as" prong of the ADA
definition of "disability.
254
b. Judge Gibbons's Concurring Opinion
In her concurring opinion, Judge Gibbons was willing to consider the
argument that "morbid obesity, because of the nature of the disorder, always
has a physiological cause. 255 Unlike the majority opinion, the concurrence
explored the legislative history of the ADA definition of physical impair-
ment. 6 Noting that no comma separated "physiological disorder" from "or
condition" in the definition explicitly adopted by the ADA and the EEOC,
Judge Gibbons concluded that "physiological" was meant to modify both
"disorder" and "condition. 2 57 Therefore, the EEOC's argument that morbid
248. See id. at 443.
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting Francis, 129 F.3d at 287).
251. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 443.
252. Id. at 439.
253. Id. at 443.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 443 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
256. Id. at 444.
257. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 444. (Gibbons, J., concurring).
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obesity as a "condition" needed no physiological cause to be an ADA im-
pairment was unfounded."'
In reaching her conclusion, Judge Gibbons discussed the few cases that
had ruled on obesity under the ADA.259 All of those cases maintained that an
individual's morbid obesity may be an ADA impairment if that individual
presented evidence of some underlying physiological cause.26° However, in
an important footnote to her review of those cases, Judge Gibbons recog-
nized the possibility "that morbid obesity is a disorder that by its very nature
has a physiological cause. 26' If this possibility were true, then Grindle
would have had no need to prove a physiological cause for his morbid obesi-
ty.262 Nonetheless, the fact that "[n]o court or agency ha[d] ever adopted this
position" and "the EEOC ha[d] put forth no evidence, medical or otherwise,
to support such a sweeping conclusion" compelled Judge Gibbons to concur
that the EEOC failed to prove that Grindle's morbid obesity was an impair-
ment-and thus potentially a disability-under the ADA.263
Both the majority and concurring opinions held that obesity and morbid
obesity must have some underlying physiological causation in order to be
considered a physical impairment under the ADA.264 The EEOC failed to
offer any evidence that either Grindle's specific case of morbid obesity or
morbid obesity in general had a proven physiological causation.265 As a re-
sult, the majority and concurring opinions both concluded that-based on
the evidence presented, the language of the ADA, and prior judicial applica-
tion of the ADA to weight discrimination claims-Grindle's morbid obesity
could not be considered an ADA disability.266
III. PROPOSAL
America's struggle with obesity has continued to worsen, but research
has shown that obesity's causation is a complex mix of multiple factors,
including environment, lifestyle, geography, genetics, and personal respon-
sibility. Given the relatively recent developments in the adjudication of dis-
ability claims involving obesity, courts, employers, and legislatures must
consider the impact of these developments and respond in a proactive and
258. Id.
259. See id. at 444-45. (Gibbons, J., concurring).
260. Id. Judge Gibbons discussed the cases of Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Re-
tardation, & Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993); Francis v. City of Meridian, 129 F.3d 281
(2d Cir. 1997); and Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997). Id.
261. Id. at 445 n.1 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
262. See id.
263. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 445 n.1 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 443-44.
265. Id. at 439.
266. Id. at 443-44.
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preventative manner. This proposal outlines some consequences of and po-
tential responses to these recent developments. First, these recent develop-
ments affirm a trend to consider the weight of personal responsibility in
determining whether a morbidly obese individual has a physical impairment
under the ADA.267 Second, courts have so far failed to consider whether
physical complications resulting from non-physiologically caused morbid
obesity are precluded from ADA protection, even if those complications
would normally be physical impairments that the ADA protects.268
A. The Weight of Personal Responsibility
The relatively recent decisions in obesity litigation mark a disturbing
jurisprudential trend of weighing a claimant's personal responsibility against
the causes for the condition that were beyond the claimant's control. This
trend could negatively impact the protection of other disabilities covered by
the ADA.2 69 This trend towards personal responsibility also fails to account
for the modem attitude of shared responsibility, exhibited in various com-
munity efforts to curb obesity.270
1. Personal Responsibility, Morbid Obesity, and Other Potentially
Affected ADA Disabilities
Although the Watkins court had to confine its analysis on appeal to the
evidence on record, which did not include any evidence regarding the phy-
siological causes of morbid obesity, the implied conclusion of the court's
reasoning is that an individual who becomes morbidly obese simply by a
combination of laziness and overeating cannot claim to have an ADA-
protected disability. Placing the burden of morbid obesity's causation entire-
ly on the individual flatly ignores and does an enormous disservice to mod-
em research regarding the multifaceted causes of obesity, especially morbid
obesity. Although research has shown that personal decisions regarding eat-
ing habits and lifestyle do play a role in causing obesity, most research
shows that a complicated combination of environmental, genetic, societal,
and other external factors are involved in causing obesity. 27' Moreover, once
an individual has developed obesity or morbid obesity, that condition is
treatable but potentially non-curable. This lends credence to the position that
267. See infra Part III.A.
268. See infra Part II1.B.
269. See infra Part III.A. 1.
270. See infra Part III.A.2.
271. See Robert J. Grossman, Countering a Weight Crisis: Predestination vs. Choice, HR
MAGAZINE (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.shrm.org/hrmagazine/articles/0304/0304covstory.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
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obesity, especially morbid obesity, is not a mutable condition. 27 ' Therefore,
even absent evidence of some physiological causation, courts have basically
relied on a default presumption of individual or personal causation with
respect to obesity.
This presumption of personal responsibility as a default causation for
morbid obesity stands in conflict with modem research showing that obesity
is as much a product of an individual's environment and genetics as it is a
product of an individual's personal choices.273 Still, some lawmakers would
place the burden of obesity entirely on the individual, rather than recogniz-
ing the need for community involvement and shared accountability.274 Nev-
ertheless, until scientists can prove a direct link between genetics, environ-
ment, and morbid obesity--or until Congress includes obesity or morbid
obesity as an explicitly protected physical impairment under the ADA-
courts will have the burden of determining how much weight to give to an
individual's personal responsibility as a factor in examining the causes of
that individual's morbid obesity.
A legitimate concern with negating the importance of personal respon-
sibility is the potential flood of claims of "voluntary" condition discrimina-
tion.275 However, the ADA already protects disabilities such as alcoholism
and drug addiction that are subject to a similar flood of claims. To hold that
a "voluntary" condition-with no proven physiological causation and
brought about solely by personal choices-cannot be an impairment under
the ADA ignores the impact that such reasoning would necessarily have if
applied to other recognized ADA disabilities, such as alcoholism, drug ad-
diction, and HIV infection.276 Although scientists have proven that alcohol-
ism and drug addiction have elements of physical addiction,277 the risk of
developing either of these protected conditions is greatly increased based on
lifestyle and voluntary decisions founded on personal responsibility. In addi-
272. See Kuss, supra note 29, at 595-97.
273. See generally Jason A. Smith, Setting the Stage for Public Health: The Role of Liti-
gation in Controlling Obesity, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 443-55 (2006). This article
was a result of a symposium entitled "America's Epidemic: The Uses of Law to Address
Obesity," co-hosted by the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School
of Law and the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, College of Public Health. Id.
Symposia such as this are evidence that obesity is a societal problem with continually devel-
oping legal ramifications.
274. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554,
109th Congress (2005); Commonsense Consumption Act, 85th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2005). See also Michael R. Wickline & Jake Bleed, Bill Filed to Shield Food Sellers
from Suits," ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 19, 2005.
275. See Shoup, supra note 55, at 226-27.
276. Id.
277. See Buxton, supra note 100, at 126-27.
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tion, many who have contracted HIV have done so at least in part because of
individual decisions regarding sexual activity and personal protection.
If courts were to adopt the reasoning of these recent adjudicative de-
velopments, and in particular the Watkins reasoning-that a condition that is
voluntary in nature and results partially from personal decisions is not an
ADA impairment-and give similar weight to the role of personal responsi-
bility, then courts potentially must examine the weight of personal responsi-
bility with respect to other disability claims under the ADA. This would
require evidence regarding the personal decisions that an individual made
leading up to his or her alcoholism, drug addiction, or infection with HIV-
or theoretically any number of disabling conditions-thus forcing courts to
consider an individual's personal lifestyle choices as a factor in determining
whether his or her condition is a physical impairment under the ADA. It is
striking that courts may be quick to weigh personal responsibility as a factor
with respect to morbid obesity but are slow to consider that same factor with
respect to other ADA disabilities that clearly have a voluntary component.
Such inconsistencies in application of reasoning can only lead to inconsis-
tent protections for the truly disabled.
2. Shared Responsibility and Wellness Programs
Based on research showing the impact of environmental factors on ob-
esity and the financial burden resulting from obesity in the workplace, many
employers have recognized their shared responsibility for employees' health
by instituting wellness programs.278 Studies have shown that, due to the de-
trimental impact that obesity has in the workplace, employers save more
financially in the long run by instituting wellness programs for their em-
ployees.279 Many programs include incentives for employee participants to
reach certain goals or participate in the program.28° Although they are one
step in providing employees with the encouragement and opportunity neces-
sary for a healthy lifestyle, the programs must still comply with the ADA.28" '
Participation in a wellness program must be voluntary, the employer
must keep confidential all information that it obtains, and the employer can-
not use any obtained information to discriminate against an employee.282
278. See Christine Williams, Wellness Programs: Useful Tools but Questions Abound, 35
A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. L. 5, 9 (Winter 2007).
279. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, An Introduction to Wellness Programs: The Legal Implica-
tions of "Bona Fide Wellness Programs," 6 BENDER'S LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN
270 (June 2006), available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/articles/0606_Bender.pdf (last
visited Apr. 21, 2007).
280. Grossman, supra note 37.




The EEOC has encouraged wellness programs in the workplace as long as
they are in compliance with the ADA.28 3 Because the future of obesity litiga-
tion is unclear, especially with respect to the degree to which courts may
consider personal responsibility as a factor in the causation of morbid obesi-
ty, employers who institute some form of wellness program will likely be
reducing both the financial impact of obesity and their exposure to liability
in the still-developing area of obesity and disability discrimination.
B. Physical Conditions Arising from Non-Physiological Morbid Obesity
Recent court decisions have also failed to consider whether the physi-
cal conditions resulting from morbid obesity might constitute a disability
under the ADA. For example, in Watkins, the employee's range of motion
and respiratory problems were physiological in nature and could well have
affected various other bodily functions or systems. 2' Because the industrial
clinic doctor reported that the employee had physical limitations other than
his morbid obesity, the court should have been on constructive notice re-
garding other physiological impairments from which the employee could
have been suffering as a result of his morbid obesity.
Most courts have failed to address the issue of other manifestations of
physical impairment. The result is a very problematic issue regarding the
logical consequences of such decisions: whether physical impairments re-
sulting from non-physiological morbid obesity can be physical impairments
under the ADA. In other words, if an individual's morbid obesity has no
proven physiological causation, does that preclude any resulting physical
conditions from being physical impairments under the ADA? According to
the reasoning in Watkins, the ADA would not protect individuals suffering
from physical side effects that stem from non-physiological obesity because
the foundational root cause of those side effects would not be physiological.
Such ambiguity in reasoning could prove problematic for future claimants
who suffer from disability discrimination based on physical impairments
that result from obesity or morbid obesity. Future claimants may first have
to demonstrate that their obesity had a physiological cause, regardless of the
fact that their obesity was a physiological cause for the physical impairment
that allegedly resulted in discrimination.
283. Id.
284. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The enactment of the ADA in 1990 was meant to provide a "compre-
hensive national mandate" for eliminating disability discrimination 285 and to
establish "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards" by which courts
could address claims of discrimination against those with disabilities. 286 The
scientific research on the causes of obesity and morbid obesity, however,
has yet to establish a clear, strong, or consistent reason why some individu-
als become obese while others do not.287 Meanwhile, continuing growth in
the number of obese Americans is most certainly having measurable effects
in the workplace and in American society as a whole.288 Because the ADA
did not specifically name obesity as a protected disability, courts deciding
allegations of weight discrimination have had to apply the protections de-
fined in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act-the ADA's precursor-in
different ways based on the different facts involved in each case.289
The most recent developments in obesity jurisprudence have held that
morbid obesity-absent evidence of physiological causation-was not an
ADA physical impairment, impliedly concluding that a claimant whose dis-
ability is the result of personal choices rather than a physiological disorder is
not "disabled" for purposes of the ADA. 290 The direction of these develop-
ments (1) presents the possibility that personal responsibility may be a factor
in considering the validity of ADA claims involving disabilities other than
obesity;29' (2) should encourage employers to develop and implement well-
ness programs in the spirit of shared responsibility; 92 and (3) fails to resolve
whether physical conditions arising from non-physiological obesity may be
protected disabilities under the ADA.293
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